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1. Introduction 
 Throughout most developed as well as developing economies, income 
distributions have become increasingly skewed in recent decades (Stiglitz, 2012; Piketty, 
2014). One reason has been declining marginal tax rates for top incomes. Another is the 
effective high marginal tax faced by low income earners due to withdrawal of benefits as 
earnings rise, leading to the poverty trap. The existing tax structures in most developed 
countries are U-shaped, with increasing marginal tax (IMT) on high earnings (but not on 
capital gains). The justification of IMT is to raise revenue from those most able to pay, 
and provide a social safety net for the poor. This view is theoretically justified by 
Diamond (1998) and Saez (2001) based on their assumption that top income follows 
Pareto distributions (see also Salanie (2003)).  
 However, the shape of the optimal tax curve seems to be sensitive to income 
distributions. With a bounded distribution, Sadka (1976) and Seade (1977) find zero 
optimal marginal tax rate for the top earner. Following this line, the tax curve should be 
inversely U-shaped or even declining (see Tuomala (1984), Kanbur and Tuomala (1994), 
Boadway et al (2000), Tarkiainen and Tuomala (2007), Hashimzade and Myles (2007), 
Boadway and Jacquet (2008), Kaplow (2008)). Then decreasing marginal taxes (DMT) 
on top income seem justifiable. But as Warren Buffet famously complained, the lower 
effective average tax rates paid by the rich, due to low capital gain taxes and various 
loopholes, are widely perceived to be unfair. This political problem often imposes a 
binding constraint on DMT and seems to imply a constrained optimal solution to be a flat 
tax, which by continuity should be closer to the optimal DMT and dominate IMT. 
Moreover, a flat tax will reduce administrative costs and avoid incentive distortions of 
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IMT (see Atkinson (1995) for a good overview). Thus Mankiw et al (2009) argue that 
“A flat tax, with a universal lump-sum transfer, could be close to optimal”. 
 On the other hand, Diamond and Saez (2011), Piketty and Saez (2012, 2013) 
(DSPS) argue that if the policy maker ignores the welfare of richest group (due to their 
low marginal utility of income) and focuses on the wellbeing of the poor majority, the 
marginal tax rate for top income should be 70-80%, substantially higher than its current 
level and the tax rates paid by the rest of the population. This policy has been successfully 
applied in the Scandinavian countries where high top tax rates co-exist with high labour 
force participation and the highest level of life satisfaction (Kleven 2014). The validity 
of different policy recommendations, IMT or flat tax, seems crucially dependent on social 
objectives as well as income distribution.  
 This paper shows that even when the optimal DMT are not feasible, a flat tax may 
not be the next best alternative. If we want to maximize the utility of the poor, IMT on 
top income earners are superior to any flat tax under a simple condition, which means 
the optimal tax on top income derived by Saez (2001) is higher than the optimal flat tax. 
This condition generally holds if we want to maximize the utility of a large poor majority. 
It also depends on income distribution, but not necessarily on boundedness. 
 Following DSPS (though they consider more general cases), we ignore the 
interests of the rich group and only maximize the utility of the poor. Later we allow 
different weights given to different poor households, leading to a similar effect as 
decreasing marginal utility of income assumed by DSPS. Surprisingly, when we put more 
weight on the very poor households, IMT are less likely to dominate a flat tax.  
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 We first assume a constant elasticity of labour supply for the whole population. 
Later we make a more realistic assumption of declining elasticity with income and show 
that IMT are more likely to dominate any flat tax. This is consistent with the optimal IMT 
obtained by Aaberge and Colombino (2013) and Andrienko et al (2014), using data from 
Norway, US, UK and Australia, with declining elasticity of labour supply.  
 Instead of a continuous tax structure, we first use a two-band tax model. The 
continuous tax curve has been criticized as “too far removed from the tax–benefit systems 
observed in practice to be a useful guide for policy” (Choné and Laroque 2005, p.396). 
Apps et al (2009) remark that “Given its significance in practice, the piecewise linear tax 
system seems to have received disproportionately little attention in the literature on 
optimal income taxation.” Diamond and Saez (2011) argue for practical and useful 
research on tax policy. The two-band tax model is the first step from a flat tax and can 
model IMT and DMT as well as a flat tax. Furthermore the two-band tax literature in 
particular supports DMT. Sheshinski (1989) first argued for rising two-band taxes under 
utilitarian and maximin objectives. However, Slemrod et al (1994) find errors in his proof 
and use numerical simulations to show that DMT are in fact optimal. Similarly Salanie 
(2003), Hindricks and Myles (2006) obtain optimal decreasing two-band taxes in a two-
class economy. Hence it is interesting to see if two-band IMT can dominate any flat tax. 
We later allow more tax bands and generalize our result accordingly.  
 We introduce our basic two-band tax model in the next section. Section 3 shows 
that any flat tax is Pareto dominated by some DMT. Section 4 gives a sufficient condition 
for IMT to dominate any flat tax and shows it is valid if we want to maximize the total 
utility of a large poor majority. Section 5 extends our model and generalizes the results 
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allowing different welfare weights for the poor, declining elasticity of labor supply and 
multi-tax bands. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2. Basic Model 
 We assume that a population, normalized to unity, consists of a continuum of 
households, whose wage is denoted by w, and is distributed on [a, b], where a > 0, b is 
bounded, but can be very large and approximately treated as infinite. The density and 
cumulative functions of w are denoted by f(w) and F(w). We define the poor population 
as those with wages below a fixed level w , and those with higher wages are the rich. The 
government’s objective is to maximize the total utility of the poor. This is similar to 
Diamond and Saez (2011) who give virtually zero weight to the rich in the social welfare 
function due to decreasing marginal utility of income. Our objective can be justified by 
the political goal of income redistributions. We first treat the poor equally and will allow 
different weights given to them in section 5(i).  
Every household has a quasi-linear utility, m – x/(1 + 1/), where m is net 
income, x is labour supply and is its elasticity. This simple utility function has been 
widely used in the literature (e.g. Atkinson 1995). We first assume an identical for the 
whole population and later allow declining elasticity in section 5(ii).  
Given wage w, a household’s pre-tax earnings y = wx. The government imposes 
two tax rates, 1t  and 2t , for earnings below and above a threshold Y. The tax revenue, 
after a fixed expenditure is paid, is distributed to all households equally as a basic income, 
denoted by B. Given our unit population B is also equal to the total transfer received by 
the whole population. The two-band taxes reduce to a flat tax when 1t  = 2t . We will allow 
more tax bands in section 5(iii). 
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Given 1t , 2t , Y and B, households’ utility functions can be written as: 
  1u  = wx(1 1t ) – 
1 1/ ε
1 1/
x



 + B    for wx  Y (1) 
  2u  = wx(1  2t ) + ( 2t   1t )Y – 
1 1/ ε
1 1/
x



 + B  for wx > Y (2)  
 Every household chooses labour supply x to maximize utility. We first consider 
IMT, i.e. 1t  < 2t  and assume Y ≥ w
(1  1t )
. Thus every poor household faces the 
lower rate t1, and chooses optimal labour supply x = w(1  1t )
. This can be justified by 
the political agenda to help the poor by charging them a low tax rate 1t . Substituting it 
into (1), we obtain the maximized utility w(1 – 1t )
/(1 + ) + B. Integrating it over 
[a, w ], we get the total utility of the poor as our objective function: 
  W = 



w
a
dwwfw
t
)(
1
)1( 1
1
1 


 + BF( w )    (3) 
 Given Y ≥ w (1  1t )
 and 1t  < 2t , the population is divided into three groups. 
All poor households and some rich ones with w < wˆ   [Y/(1 – 1t )
] choose labor 
supply x = w(1  1t )
 and pay tax of 1t (1  1t )
w. Very rich households with w > 1w   
[Y/(1 – 2t )
] choose x = w(1  2t )
 and pay tax  2t (1  2t )
w  ( 1t   2t )Y. The 
remaining rich households with wˆ  < w  1w  choose x = Y/w, earning Y, i.e. bunching, and 
pay 1t Y. As 1t [F( 1w ) – F( wˆ )]  ( 1t  2t )[1 – F( 1w )] = 1t [1 – F( wˆ )] – 2t [1 – F( 1w )], the 
total tax revenue from these three groups is: 
  R = 

w
a
dwwfwtt
ˆ
1
11 )()1(

 + 

b
w
dwwfwtt
1
)()1( 122
   
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  + { 1t [1 – F( wˆ )] – 2t [1 – F( 1w )]}Y     (4) 
We assume the fixed expenditure is less than R, so B is positive and maximized 
whenever R is. So we can replace R by B. Under a flat tax, 1t  = 2t = t, we have wˆ  = 1w , 
and (4) reduces to 

b
a
dwwfwtt )()1( 1  . Then  our objective function (3) reduces to: 
  W =  
 w
a
dwwf
wt
)(
1
])1[( 1


 + F( w ) 

b
a
dwwfwtt )()1( 1   (3’) 
3. DMT vs. flat tax  
 The literature (e.g. Slemrod et al (1994)) has shown that DMT are generally 
optimal for two-band taxes under maximin or utilitarian objectives. In this section we 
further show that a flat tax is always Pareto dominated by some DMT.  
 We start with a flat tax t > 0, and consider to lower tax rate t2 for earnings beyond 
Y = (1 t)[1 – t/(1 – t)]b. As (1 t)b is the highest earnings, there is a positive 
mass earning more than Y, and we can show that each of them will pay more tax with a 
lower tax rate t2. The tax payment from a household within this group is 2t (1  2t )
w 
 (t  2t )Y. According to Saez (2001) the impact of tax change can be decomposed into 
two effects, mechanical and behavioral. The former assumes a constant labor supply and 
can be expressed as [(1  2t )
w  Y] 2t , and the latter reflects the response of labor 
supply and is indicated by  2t (1  2t )
w 2t . Adding them together the derivative 
of the tax payment respect to 2t  is negative at 2t  t if (1 t)
[1 – t/(1 – t)]w  Y, 
which is guaranteed for any w < b given our definition of Y. Thus each household earning 
more than Y pays more tax when 2t  falls. These households must be better off due to a 
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lower marginal tax rate and higher B. Moreover the poorer households are better off too 
due to higher basic income B. Therefore a lower 2t  benefits everyone, including the poor. 
 Proposition 1: Every flat tax is Pareto dominated by some DMT. 
 The intuition follows from Saez’ (2001) concept of behavioural and mechanical 
responses. A lower 2t  will motivate rich households to increase their labor supply. If the 
tax threshold Y is set sufficiently high, the tax revenue loss will be limited, and the extra 
labor supply from each household can generate significant tax revenue due to its high 
productivity. So the behavioural effect dominates the mechanical effect, leading to a 
higher revenue. This lower tax applies to a positive mass, not just the highest earner, 
different from the zero top marginal tax obtained by Sadka (1976) and Seade (1977). 
 When DMT are optimal but politically infeasible, a flat tax seems to be the 
constrained optimal solution if it is closer to the optimum than and thus dominates IMT 
by continuity. However, this monotonicity of tax policy may not be valid. Assuming the 
government is politically constrained to implement two-band IMT and maximize the total 
utility of the poor, we will show that under a simple condition the optimal flat tax is 
dominated by some IMT. Before proving this result, we first obtain the optimal flat tax 
t*, which maximizes our objective function (3’).  
To simplify the notation, we denote the total earnings of the poor households 
under a flat tax by 1E  ≡ 

w
a
dwwfwt )()1( 1   and denote the earnings of the rich by 2E  
≡ 

b
w
dwwfwt )()1( 1  . The total earnings of the whole population is E = 1E  + 2E . Since 
the population is normalized to 1, E is also the average earnings of the whole population. 
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The average earnings of the poor and rich are 1e ≡ 1E /F( w ) and 2e ≡ 2E /[1 – F( w )] 
respectively. By the definition we always have 1e   E   2e .  
 We differentiate (3’) and find dW/dt = [1 – t(1 + )]F( w )E/(1 – t) – 1E . It is 
positive if and only if t < (1 – 1e /E)/(1 +  – 1e /E]. So we obtain the optimal flat tax t*. 
 Proposition 2: The optimal flat tax to maximize (3’) is t* =
Ee
Ee
/1
/1
1
1



. 
 This result is a special case of Piketty and Saez (2013), who derive an optimal 
linear tax of (1 – g )/(1 +  – g ), where g  is the average social welfare weight weighted 
by pre-tax incomes, which “is also the ratio of the average income weighted by individual 
social welfare weights ig  to the actual average income” (p. 21). Given our welfare 
function, which only values the utility of the poor, g = 1e /E and their formula reduces 
to our t*. Piketty and Saez (2013) further discuss the median voter tax rate, which 
maximizes the utility of the median earner, and point out “a tight connection between 
optimal tax theory and political economy”. If 1e  is equal to the median income, our t* 
becomes the median voter tax. Interestingly, the median income in the U.S. is roughly 
$26,000. Piketty and Saez estimate the average top 1% income as $1.2 million. Given 
the average earnings of $38,000, the average of the bottom 99%, 1e  is also about $26,000. 
Thus our flat tax for the 99% majority is equal to the median voter tax rate.  
4. IMT vs. flat tax  
Given the optimal flat tax t*, the question now is whether some IMT ( 1t < 2t ) can 
generate a higher value of (3) than t* does. This must be true if we find W/ 1t  < 0 and 
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W/ 2t  > 0 when 1t  = 2t  = t*. In fact these two conditions are identical and we can focus 
on W/ 2t  > 0. Notice that the first term in (3) does not depend on 2t . If 2t  maximizes 
(3), it must maximize B (i.e. R). This is essentially the approach taken by Saez (2001). 
To prove that IMT can dominate the optimal flat tax, we just need to show B/ 2t  > 0 
when 1t  = 2t  = t*, instead of finding the optimal 2t .  
For simple presentation we let Y = w (1  1t )
. This is not the only choice to 
obtain our results. For example, if we let Y = w (1  t*), the marginal poor (w = w ) 
will bunch when we lower 1t  and raise 2t , but this does not change the condition for 
W/ 1t  > 0 and W/ 2t  < 0 at 1t  = 2t  = t*, and has no effect on our result. Since our goal 
is to find a sufficient condition for IMT to dominate t*, this particular Y serves the 
purpose. Y = w (1  1t )
 implies wˆ  = w . The tax revenue (4) (hence B) simplifies to:  
  B = 

w
a
dwwfwtt )()1( 111

 + 

b
w
dwwfwtt
1
)()1( 122
   
  + { 1t [1 – F( w )] – 2t [1 – F(w1)]}Y     (4’) 
 Then we investigate whether two-band taxes with 1t  < 2t  can lead to a higher 
value of (3) than the optimal flat tax t*, with B in (3) replaced by (4’). 
Proposition 3: There exists a two-bracket tax schedule with 1t < t* < 2t  that 
dominates the optimal linear tax rate t*, if at 1t  = 2t = t*, we have 
 
E
e1  >
2e
Y
             (5) 
Proof: see Appendix A. 
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 As we mentioned earlier, W/ 1t  < 0 and W/ 2t  > 0 depend on the same 
condition. This is not coincidental. If both W/ 1t  > 0 and W/ 2t  > 0, it would be 
feasible to increase (3) by raising 1t  and 2t  together. But this is impossible since t* is the 
optimal flat tax to maximize (3’).  
 Intuitively (5) can again be explained by Saez’ (2001) concept of behavioural and 
mechanical responses as in Proposition 1. The difference is that here some households’ 
tax payment increases with 2t , while others’ may fall with 2t . Given  2t > 0 at 1t  = 2t  = 
t*, the mechanical effect on (4’) is { 

b
w
dwwfwt )(*)1( 1   – [1 – F( w )]Y} 2t , and the 
behavioral effect is –[ 

b
w
dwwfwtt )(*)1(* 11  ] 2t . If their net effect is positive, i.e. 
[1 – t*/(1 – t*)] 2e > Y, as shown by (A2) in Appendix A, the overall mechanical effect 
dominates the behavioral effect, and the total tax payment rises with 2t , i.e., B/ 2t  > 0.  
Here the tax revenue rises, similar to the case of Proposition 1, due to a rise in 2t  instead 
of its fall. Since 1 – t*/(1 – t*) is equal to 1e /E, the condition reduces to (5), which 
guarantees the optimal flat tax t* to be dominated by some IMT1. 
Moreover, our result can be obtained by directly comparing the optimal flat tax 
t* with the optimal top income tax rate obtained in Saez (2001). Without an income effect 
as assumed here, his tax rate becomes (1 – g)/[1 – g +  2e /( 2e  – Y)], where g is the social 
welfare weight given to the rich (also see Piketty and Saez (2013)). In our model g = 0 
since no welfare weight is given to the rich. Thus Saez’ optimal top income tax rate 
                                                 
1 We are very grateful to an anonymous referee for his suggestion on this interpretation. 
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becomes ( 2e  – Y)/[(1 + ) 2e  – Y]. If it is higher than t*, IMT must dominate t*. However 
no one has explicitly compared these two tax rates. In fact Saez’ asymptotic marginal tax 
rate ta can be obtained from [1 – ta/(1 – ta)] 2e  = Y. Hence t
a > t* if and only if (5) holds2. 
Otherwise Saez’ marginal tax for top income will not be consistent with IMT.   
 Since (5) is evaluated under a flat tax, term (1  t*) drops out and the inequality 
only depends on the wage distribution, not on taxes. To evaluate (5), it is often convenient 
to consider the income distribution function G(y), with y = w, instead of wage 
distribution F(w). We can calculate 1e , 2e  and E with zero taxes, and let Y be y  ≡ w
. 
For some distributions the validity of (5) does not depends on y . For instance, when the 
income distribution is nearly unbounded, we may approximate it by a Pareto distribution, 
G(y) = 1 – y for y  1,  > 1. Then condition (5) holds for any y 3. This result is 
consistent with Diamond (1998). The reason may appear to be the Pareto distribution’s 
thick-tail of top earnings. However, when  is large, the tail becomes very thin while (5) 
still holds. To illustrate this point further, we consider a thick-tailed distribution G(y) = 
(y/h), with 0 ≤ y ≤ h and  > 0. The number of rich households may not fall but even rise 
with income (if  > 1). But (5) never holds4. The validity of (5) may appear to require an 
unbounded income, but this is not necessarily true either. Let us consider a bounded 
Pareto distribution with G(y) = (1 – y)/(1 – h), with 1 ≤ y ≤ h and  > 1. It can be 
shown that (5) holds for any h and y , even when the maximum income h is very low and 
close to 1. These examples demonstrate (5) is very sensitive to distributions. 
                                                 
2 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing to this connection and implication. 
3 As 
2E  =  y
/( – 1), 1 – G( y ) = y , E = /( – 1), 2e  = y E, so (5) becomes 1e  > 1.  
4 As 
1E  =  y
/h( + 1), E = h/( + 1), and 1e  =  y /( + 1), (5) requires 2e  > h.  
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 In spite of such complexity, the validity of (5) may be determined by simple data 
without knowing income distributions precisely. For instance, Diamond and Saez (2011) 
estimate the threshold earnings of the top 1% U.S. earners as $0.4 million and their 
average earnings as $1.2 million. This implies Y/ 2e  = 1/3, which is lower than 1e /E, 
given 1e  = $26,000 and E = $38,000 as we mentioned earlier. So condition (5) holds.  
 Moreover, if we know the income distribution above the threshold y , (5) can be 
simplified. According to extreme value theory (Gnedenko (1943)), for a wide range of 
random variables, the conditional probability approximately follows a Pareto distribution 
when they are sufficiently large. This theory and empirical evidence suggest a Pareto 
distribution as a good approximation for top earners. Let G(y) = 1 – Ky for y ≥ y ,  > 
1, we obtain 2e / y  = /( – 1) and can simplify (5) to:  
 1 – 
E
e1  < 

1
        (6) 
In this case a thick tail does have a crucial impact. Given 1e /E, a very thick tail 
( close to 1) guarantees (6); while a thin tail (a large ) ensures its violation. For the top 
1% earners in the US, Diamond and Saez (2011) estimate  = 1.5, so (6) becomes 1e /E 
> 1/3. It holds as 1e /E = 26/38. For U.S. 1992 earnings above $150,000, Saez (2001) 
shows  = 2 (i.e. Y/ 2e  = 0.5). Similarly Bach et al (2012) find  = 2 for German top 
earnings. Then (6) becomes 1e  > 0.5E. For any Pareto distribution with a finite , when 
Y is sufficiently large, 1e must be close to E and (6) will certainly hold. 
Corollary: If high earnings follow a Pareto distribution, a higher tax on a small 
group of top earners always benefits the remaining population. 
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This result supports DSPS’s view about a higher tax on top earners. But this may 
only apply to a small rich group, e.g. 1%. The current top tax rate, however, usually 
applies to a much larger group. Bach et al (2012) argue that their top tax rate of 2/3 in 
Germany should only apply to an income level much higher than the current threshold. 
Indeed when we consider a higher tax on a large group, (5) may not hold. For instance, 
if we consider a higher tax on the top 50%, i.e. Y = the median earnings, (5) does not hold 
for any lognormal distribution. Therefore it seems undesirable to impose a higher tax rate 
on the rich half of the population on behalf of the poor half.  
The question is to find a reasonable size of the rich group for justifiable IMT. It 
is difficult to answer this question by (5) directly since it is very sensitive to income 
distributions which can hardly be identified precisely. It would be desirable to check its 
validity without assuming specific distributions. This is easier to do using another 
condition equivalent to (5). It depends on whether we have a decreasing 1e / 2e , the ratio 
of the average earnings of the poor and the rich (Proof: see Appendix B).  
Proposition 4: (5) holds if and only if e1/e2 falls around Y.  
If the curve of 1e / 2e  is single peaked, after its maximum, the ratio will fall and 
IMT will dominate any flat tax. When earnings are unbounded and Y is sufficiently large, 
1e  will approach to E but 2e will go to infinity. So 1e / 2e must fall and (5) holds 
eventually. In this case unbounded earnings are likely to justify IMT. The question is: 
how large Y is “sufficient”. The answer may be difficult to obtain by theory alone and 
empirical data may reveal how large a rich group should be subject to a higher tax.  
 Our data are obtained from the United Nation’s “World Income Inequality 
Database” (May 2008), and provide each decile’s earnings as percentages of aggregate 
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earnings. The data set does not contain the relevant information for all years. To avoid 
subjective bias we use the most recent data for each country. Unfortunately, our ratio of 
1e / 2e does not take into account complex tax systems which generate real data. So when 
we use the actual earnings ratios to justify IMT, it is an approximation, not accurate 
prediction. On the other hand, despite complex tax systems in G8 countries, we find their 
1e / 2e  curves are all single peaked and fall from similar thresholds of income deciles.  
 We use a decile’s earnings as a percentage of the aggregate earnings to calculate 
1e / 2e . The ratio of this group’s earnings to that of the whole population is given as r ≡ 
1E /E. So 1e  = 1E /G(y) = rE/G(y). 2e  = (E – 1E )/[1 – G(y)], i.e. (1 – r)E/[1 – G(y)]. Hence 
1e / 2e  = r[1 – G(y)]/(1 – r)G(y). The data provide us the values of r for G(y) = 10% to 
90%, giving us 9 values of 1e / 2e . The results for G8 countries are given below.    
Table 1: Ratio of 1e / 2e  for G8 Countries 
Country Year 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 
Canada 2000 0.25 0.32 0.35 0.38 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.38 0.34 
France 2000 0.38 0.40 0.44 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.46 0.44 0.42 
Germany 2000 0.31 0.37 0.40 0.42 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.41 0.38 
Italy 2002 0.21 0.27 0.31 0.32 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.34 0.31 
Russia 2000 0.13 0.20 0.24 0.27 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.27 0.23 
UK 1999 0.23 0.28 0.31 0.32 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.32 0.28 
USA 2000 0.17 0.23 0.26 0.29 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.31 0.27 
Japan 1971 0.05 0.16 0.22 0.26 0.29 0.30 0.30 0.29 0.25 
 
  Apparently, the ratio differs significantly between eight nations. However, 1e / 2e
exhibits a single peak in all G8 countries and surprisingly, it starts to decline around 80% 
of income levels. Hence a higher tax can be justified when it is imposed on less than 20% 
of top earners on the behalf of more than 80% poor majority.  
5. Extensions 
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(i) Welfare weight: So far we have treated all the poor equally. Ideally we may give them 
different welfare weights, and allow a continuous treatment across the rich and the poor. 
This is similar to the approach taken by DSPS based on decreasing marginal utility of 
income. Assigning decreasing weight to income has a similar effect as assuming 
decreasing marginal utility of income. Intuitively, one may expect that this should 
increase the chance of justifying IMT. This expectation is similar to the conventional 
belief that IMT are mostly justifiable under maximin, and is not correct.  
 Given w  we assign welfare weight s(w) to every poor household w (≤ w ) such 
that 
w
a
dwwfws )()(  = F( w ). We then multiply s(w) with each poor household’s net 
utility [(1  1t )w]
/(1 + ) + B, and integrate the product over [a, w ], to get a weighted 
utility of the poor as our new objective function: 
   W = 
1 ε
1(1 )
1
t


 

w
a
dwwfwws )()( 1  + BF( w )     (7) 
 (7) reduces to (3) when s(w) = 1. Since s(w) generally falls with w, we have 


w
a
dwwfwws )()( 1   < 

w
a
dwwfw )(1  . We use 1
~e  to denote the weighted average 
earnings of the poor, (1 t) 

w
a
dwwfwws )()( 1  /F( z ). The more weight is given to the 
poorer households the lower 1
~e  is. Similar to the previous case, we first obtain the 
optimal flat tax t
~
* which maximizes (7). It is similar to t*, except for 1e  being replaced 
by 1
~e , i.e. t
~
* = (1 – 1
~e /E)/(1 +   – 1
~e /E]. Then IMT dominate any flat tax if W/ 1t  < 
0 and W/ 2t  > 0 when 1t  = 2t = t
~
*. Obtaining such a condition we can generalize the 
previous condition (5) for IMT to dominate any flat tax (see Appendix C). 
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Proposition 5: IMT give a higher value of (7) than any flat tax if at 1t  = 2t = t
~
* 
 
E
e1
~
 >
2e
Y
        (8) 
When s(w) = 1, 1
~e  = 1e  and (8) reduces to (5). So condition (8) is a generalization 
of (5), and can also be linked to Saez’ asymptotic marginal tax rate. Given any 1
~e  < 1e , 
the optimal tax rate for top income remains the same as before since it must maximize 
the tax revenue, but the optimal flat tax is higher given higher welfare weights on the 
very poor. So the former is less likely to be higher than the latter, and (8) is less likely to 
hold than (5) is, thus IMT are less likely to be justifiable, unexpectedly. The intuition is 
that the poorer households are less productive, and rely more on income transfer. A 
higher tax on low earnings is less damaging to low income earners and more beneficial 
to them due to more tax revenue and money transfer from the rich. So a flat tax is more 
likely to dominate IMT if we give most weight to the poorest.  
The validity of (5) only implies IMT can benefit the poor as a whole, not 
necessarily each of them. (8) can tell us if IMT benefit a particular household. Our 
objective to maximize (7) is identical to maximizing the utility of a household with 
earnings of 1
~e . This is consistent with the political agenda to help a representative family 
in the society. When (8) holds, IMT can benefit those with earnings higher than 1
~e . If it 
holds when 1
~e  is equal to the lowest earnings, IMT can benefit all poor. For instance, 
given a Pareto distribution with  = 1.5 for the top 1% earners, Y/ 2e  = 1/3, and (8) 
becomes 1
~e /E > 1/3. In most OECD countries (except for US), the ratio of the minimum 
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wage to average wage is more than 1/35. So a higher tax on top 1% can benefit all 99%. 
Similarly, with  = 2 for the top German earnings, (8) becomes 1
~e /E > 0.5. The lowest 
and average monthly German salaries are €1,832 and €34496. Thus virtually all poor can 
benefit from a higher tax on the rich. 
(ii) Declining elasticity: Empirical data show that full-time and high income earners are 
less responsive to tax changes than part-time and low income earners (see Aaberge and 
Colombino (2013) and Andrienko et al (2014)). So our constant elasticity of labor supply 
is unrealistic. In fact this assumption is unfavorable for justifying IMT. Now we allow 
the elasticity to be declining with income. Our objectives (3) and (3’), and the tax revenue 
(4’) remain valid, except that  cannot be taken out of the integrals. We follow the same 
approach as before, i.e. first to obtain the optimal flat tax *tˆ , which maximizes (3’), then 
evaluate W/ 1t  and W/ 2t  when 1t  = 2t = *tˆ .  
 Following DSPS we define the average elasticity of labor supply, weighted by 
earnings, as ˆ  ≡ 

b
a
dwwfw )(1  / 

b
a
dwwfw )(1  , and define the average elasticity of the 
rich as 2ˆ  ≡ 

b
w
dwwfw )(1  / 

b
w
dwwfw )(1  . Declining elasticity implies 2ˆ < ˆ . Then 
we differentiate (3’) to get the optimal flat tax *tˆ  = (1 – 1e /E)/(1 + ˆ – 1e /E). If W/ 1t  
< 0 and W/ 2t  > 0 when 1t  = 2t  = *tˆ , we know IMT dominate any flat tax. 
Proposition 6: With declining elasticity of labor supply, some IMT dominate any 
flat tax if at 1t  = 2t = *tˆ , we have 
                                                 
5 See https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=MIN2AVE. 
6 See http://www.tradingeconomics.com/germany/wage. 
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1 –
E
e1  < (1 –
2e
Y
)
2
ˆ
ˆ


             (9) 
 Proof: see Appendix D. 
Inequality (9) reduces to (5) if 2ˆ = ˆ . Given 2ˆ < ˆ , (9) is more likely to hold than 
(5) is, and IMT are more likely to dominate any flat tax, as expected. Given a Pareto 
distribution with  = 2 for top income, Y/ 2e  = 0.5, and (9) becomes 1 – 1e /E < 0.5 ˆ / 2ˆ
. If ˆ / 2ˆ  = 2 (e.g. ˆ  = 0.4, 2ˆ  = 0.2), (9) is guaranteed. Once again an intuitive 
explanation emerges from the comparison of the optimal flat tax and Saez’ asymptotic 
marginal tax rate. Given 2ˆ  we have Saez’ revenue maximizing top income tax rate. But 
if the average elasticity ˆ  is higher, the flat tax *tˆ must be lower. Hence the former is 
more likely to be higher than the latter, and (9) is more likely to hold than (5). 
(iii) More tax bands: Finally, we consider the case of more than two tax bands. We 
assume 1t  only applies to incomes between Y and another threshold 0Y , below which 
different tax rates may apply. So 1t  is only imposed on households with w ≥ 0w , where 
0w
(1 – 1t )
 = 0Y . Let u(w) be the utility of those households with w ≤ 0w (< w ), not 
subject to either 1t  or 2t . Then the utility of the poor, (3) can be rewritten as:  
  W = 
0
)()(
w
a
dwwfwu  + 



w
w
dwwfw
t
0
)(
1
)1( 1
1
1 


 + BF( w )               (10) 
 Let 0B  be the basic income transferred from earnings below 0Y , and F( 0w ) be the 
households with w ≤ 0w . They are independent of 1t  and 2t . When 1t  = 2t = t, we have: 
 B = 0B  + t(1 – t)
 

b
w
dwwfw
0
)(1   – t 0Y [1 – F( 0w )]               (11) 
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 The question is: whether a higher tax on income above Y ( 2t  > 1t ) can lead to a 
higher value of (10) than any partial flat tax t on income above 0Y , given other tax rates 
below 0Y  fixed. To answer this question, we follow the same approach again as before. 
We first obtain the optimal partial flat tax *t

 on income above 0Y . Then we find the 
condition for W/ 1t  < 0 and W/ 2t  > 0 when 1t  = 2t  = *t

.  
 We let 0E  denote the earnings of households with w ≥ 0w  under a flat tax t, i.e., 
0E  = (1 – t)



b
w
dwwfw
0
)(1  . Their average earnings 0e  = 0E /[1 – F( 0w )]. The optimal 
tax *t

 can be written as (1 – d)/(1 +  – d), where d = 0Y / 0e  + ( 0E – 2E )/F( w ) 0E . Thus 
we can generalize (5) to the case with more than two tax bands (see Appendix E). 
Proposition 7: IMT can do better than any partial flat tax if at 1t  = 2t = *t

, 
  
0
0
e
Y
+ 
0
20
)( EwF
EE 
 > 
2e
Y
               (12) 
 In our previous two-band tax case, 0Y  = 0, 0w  = a, 0E  = E, (12) reduces to (5). 
Although (12) is more complex than (5), its validity may be determined with simple data. 
In particular (12) must hold when 0Y / 0e  ≥ Y/ 2e . For instance, if earnings above 0Y  follow 
a Pareto distribution with 0Y / 0e = Y/ 2e , (12) must hold and a higher tax rate above Y is 
desirable. Moreover, let 0Y  = $0.15 million and Y = $0.4 million, we have 0Y / 0e = 0.5 
according to Saez (2001), and Y/ 2e  = 1/3 according to Diamond and Saez (2011). Again 
(12) holds and the tax rate above $0.4 million should be higher. These results again 
support DSPS’ higher taxes for top earners.  
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6. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we argue that IMT are often better than any flat tax if we want to 
maximize the total utility of a large poor majority. We obtain a sufficient condition for 
IMT to dominate any flat tax, which only depends on aggregate features of the income 
distribution and the tax threshold. Using empirical data from G8 countries we find 
supporting evidence that a higher tax rate is justifiable when imposed on a small group 
(less than 20%). However, IMT become less likely to dominate any flat tax if we give 
more welfare weights to the very poor households. Similar to our original condition (5), 
more general results are obtained with declining elasticity of labor supply and multi-band 
taxes. These findings support the argument of DSPS for higher taxes on top earners. It 
also has interesting political economy implications, and might perhaps be interpreted as 
an explanation for – or at least consistent with – IMT on high income earners in most 
democracies, in contrast to much optimal tax theory.  
 In this paper we do not consider categorical benefits associated with 
unemployment or low income. Those benefits create high marginal tax rates for 
participation in the labour market - the ‘poverty trap’. This phenomenon, however, does 
not affect the larger part of the working population. We focus on the tax rates relevant to 
the working population and do not consider more complex structures. We do not focus 
on the level of tax rates and the magnitude of social gains. Both tend to be small in our 
model, but would be more significant given low marginal utility of income and low 
elasticity of labour supply for the rich. Though highly stylized, we hope that this paper 
contributes to the debate on tax policies.  
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Appendix A, Proof of Proposition 3:  
We show that W/ 1t  < 0 and W/ 2t  > 0 when 1t  = 2t = t* if and only if (5) holds. From 
(4’) we see B/ 1w  = 2t f( 1w )Y – 2t (1 – 2t )
f( 1w ) 1w
 = 0 as (1 – 2t )

1w
  Y. So we 
can differentiate B given 1w  fixed. As 1t  = 2t , 1w  = w , 1t [1 – F( w )] – 2t [1 – F(w1)] = 0, 
so we can ignore the change of Y when we differentiate (4’) with respect to 1t  and 2t . 
 
1t
B


= (1 – 1t )
[1 – (1+) 1t ] 

w
a
dwwfw )(1   + [1 – F( w )]Y 
 
2t
B


 = (1 – 2t )
[1 – (1 + ) 2t ] 

b
w
dwwfw
1
)(1   – [1 – F( 1w )]Y 
Using 1E  and 2E , they reduce to [1 – t/(1 – t)] 1E  + [1 – F( w )]Y and [1 – t/(1 – t)] 2E  
– [1 – F( w )]Y. Substituting them into W/ 1t  and W/ 2t  given 1t  = 2t , we find  
 
1t
W


 = F( w ){[(1 –
t
t
1

) 1E  + [1 – F( w )]Y} –  1E      (A1)  
  
2t
W


 = F( w ){[(1 –
t
t
1

) 2E  – [1 – F( w )]Y}     (A2) 
As t* = (1 – 1e /E)/(1 +  – 1e /E) and 1E /F( w ) = 1e , (A1) < 0 and (A2) > 0 if and only if 
11Ee /E + [1 – F( w )]Y – 1e < 0, and 21Ee /E – [1 – F( w )]Y > 0. Moreover as 11Ee /E –
1e  = – 21Ee /E, and 2E /[1 – F( w )] = 2e , both inequalities become 21ee  > EY, i.e. (5).  
When (5) holds, there exist a two-bracket tax schedule with 1t  < t* < 2t , dominating t*. 
Since t* is the optimal linear tax rate, the two-bracket schedule dominates any flat tax. 
Appendix B, Proof of Proposition 4:  
The derivative of 1e / 2e  with respect to w  is negative if 2e
w
e

 1  < 1e
w
e

 2 .  
Note 1e  =
)(
1
wF
E
, 2e  =
)(1
2
wF
E

, 
w
E

 1  = Yf( w ) = 
w
E

 2 . So we obtain  
 
w
e

 1  = 
2)(
)(
wF
wf
[YF( w ) – 1E ] = 
)(
)(
wF
wf
(Y – 1e ).          (B1) 
 
w
e

 2  = 
2)](1[
)(
wF
wf

{ 2E  – Y[1 – F( w )]} = 
)(1
)(
wF
wf

( 2e  – Y)    (B2) 
Hence 1e / 2e  falls with w  if and only if 2e (Y – 1e )/F( w ) < 1e ( 2e  – Y)/[1 – F( w )], i.e. 
2E (Y – 1e ) < 1E ( 2e  – Y), or EY < 21eE  + 12eE  = 21ee , which is (5).   
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Appendix C, Proof of Proposition 5:  
Since (7) is similar to (3), W/ 1t  is similar to (A1) and < 0 if and only if 
 [(1 –
t
t
1

) 1E  + [1 – F( w )]Y – 1
~e  < 0     (C) 
Substituting *
~
t = (1 – 1
~e /E)/(1 +  – 1
~e /E) into (C), we get 11
~ Ee /E + [1 – F( w )]Y < 1
~e
, or [1 – F( w )]Y < 21
~ Ee /E, i.e. EY  < 21
~ ee . This also applies to W/ 2t > 0. 
Appendix D, Proof of Proposition 6:  
Similar to Appendix A, except for varying , we find when 1t  = 2t ,   
 
2t
B


 = (1 –
t
t
1
ˆ
2 ) 2E  – [1 – F( w )]Y      (D1) 
When 1t  = 2t = *tˆ , (D1) is positive if and only if  
 [1 – 


ˆ
ˆ
2 (1 –
E
e1 )] 2E  > [1 – F( w )]Y      (D2) 
Dividing (D2) by 2E , we get 1 – (1 – 1e /E) 2ˆ / ˆ  > Y/ 2e . One can check that the same 
condition holds for W/ 1t  < 0.  
Appendix E, Proof of Proposition 7:  
Given (11) and 1t  = 2t = t, we have B/ 0w  = 0 as 0w
(1 – t) = 0Y . So we differentiate 
(11) given 0w  fixed, and find B/t = [1 – t/(1 – t)] 0E  – 0Y [1 – F( 0w )]. From (10) we 
see W/ 0w  = 0 since u( 0w ) must be equal to [ 0w (1 – t)]
/(1 + ). So we differentiate 
(10) given 1t  = 2t and 0w fixed. Substitute B/t into W/t, we get 
 
t
W


= F( w ){(1 –
t
t
1

) 0E  – 0Y [1 – F( 0w )]} – 0E  + 2E     (E)  
The optimal partial flat tax can be solved from (E) = 0, as *t

 = (1 – d)/(1 +  – d), where 
d = { 0Y [1 – F( 0w )] + ( 0E  – 2E )/F( w )}/ 0E  = 0Y / 0e  + ( 0E  – 2E )/F( w ) 0E .  
Then we check if W/ 2t  > 0 by substituting *t

 into (A2). This is equivalent to check if 
*t

 < (1 – Y/ 2e )/(1 +  – Y/ 2e ), i.e., d > Y/ 2e , which holds if and only if 
 
0
0
e
Y
+ 
0
20
)( EwF
EE 
 > 
2e
Y
   
One can check that the same condition holds for W/ 1t  < 0.   
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Appendix F (not for publication), (5) holds for any bounded Pareto distribution:  
From G(y), we obtain 1 – G(y) = (y – h)/(1 – h), and g(y) = y/(1 – h). 
Then we have 1E  =
)1)(1(
)1( 1








h
y
 , E =
)1)(1(
)1( 1








h
h
, and 2E  =
)1)(1(
)( 11




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, and (5) becomes: 
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     (F1) 
When h = its minimum y, the L'Hôpital's rule implies the equality of (F1). So (5) always 
holds if L = 
)1(
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)( 11
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rises with h, which must be true if:  
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 ≥ 0  (F2) 
When y = its minimum 1, (F2) = 0 for any h. So we just need to show (F2) increasing 
with y. This is true if 

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
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increases with y. Let s ≡ h/y ≥ 1, this holds 
if 1L  ≡
1
1
1 



s
  
1

s
falls with s, i.e. 
s
L

 1  ≤ 0, or 
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
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>
2
12
)1( 



s
s
, i.e.  
 2L  = ( – 1)(s
 – 1) – s(s – 1) ≥ 0     (F3)  
When s = 1, 2L  = 0. So it suffices to show 2L  increases with s, i.e.  
 
s
L

 2  = ( – 1)s – ( – 1)s – 0.5s(s – 1) ≥ 0  (F4) 
This is true if 3L  = ( – 1)(s
 – s) – 0.5(s – 1) = ( – 1)s – ( – 0.5)s + 0.5 
≥ 0. When s = 1, 3L  = 0. So 3L  ≥ 0 if  3L /s = ( – 1)( – 0.5)s
( s  – 1) ≥ 0, which 
is guaranteed. Hence (5) must hold for any  > 1, h ≥ y ≥ 1. 
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